You can see the result of my work in the graph below, which breaks down arms transfers in the Asia-Pacific by source (American, Chinese, or other). Although slightly arbitrary, I choose to focus on transfers since 2011, which is when the United States announced that it would 'pivot' or 'rebalance' towards Asia.
The U.S. supplied a considerable variety of arms (both new and refurbished) to pretty much all of its major regional allies over the past three years, ranging from surplus patrol boats to advanced missile guidance systems.
This pattern clearly fits into the the United States' recent approach to the region. As part of its 'pivot' towards Asia, the U.S. has been looking to reconnect with old allies and bolster connections with existing partners. Adding to long-established bases in Japan and South Korea, for example, the U.S. recently began to rotate a set of littoral combat ships through Singapore, announced the deployment of 2,500 marines to Australia, and negotiated access to new military bases in the Philippines. Taken in tandem, this activity suggests that the U.S. is looking to reassure these states that it remains committed to their defence—by both establishing a local American presence and bolstering their own capacity to counter external threats (read: China).
Unsurprisingly, the U.S. also accounted for 95 per cent of all arms transferred to Taiwan. Though officially recognizing the PRC as the sole government of China—as almost all nations do—the U.S. government remains bound by the the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to "make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capabilities."
The People's Republic of China
Though it exported fewer arms than the United States, China was still a major supplier of arms in the region. Pakistan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh were all big Chinese clients over the past three years. China also supplied a significant percentage of the arms imported by Laos and Cambodia—60 and 48 per cent, respectively.
China's support of Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar is interesting, as China has sought to cultivate influence in all three countries in recent years. In addition to being a major arms supplier, China has also become a major bilateral trading partner and investor in all three countries. This growing economic and military influence has significant regional implications, as all three states are members of ASEAN, which works on a consensus based model. China may, as a result, be able to leverage its influence in these countries to play a more active role in shaping ASEAN's agenda
There is already some evidence that this strategy is paying dividends. In 2012, ASEAN discussions of the South China Sea—overlapping portions of which are claimed by six states, including China—broke down over Cambodia's reluctance to endorse a position that would embarrass China, so ASEAN was unable to issue a joint communique to conclude its summit meeting—the first time it had failed to do so in its 45 year history.
Note: For the sake of readability, I excluded India from the graph. Although India was the region's biggest recipient of foreign arms—importing over 13.5 billion TIVs worth in the past three years—the United States supplied only a small portion of India's imports (transferring 1.3 billion TIVs worth), while China supplied none.
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